《保险研究》20201103-《董事高管责任保险与企业战略》（邢斐、周泰云）

［摘   要］企业购买董事高管责任保险是管理层的“自利工具”还是公司行为的“治理利器”？这是保险学和管理学需要讨论的重要问题。本文从公司行为的整体层面分析,系统地考察了董事高管责任保险对企业战略的影响。结果表明,企业购买董事高管责任保险后,战略激进度会显著提高,该结论在使用工具变量法控制内生性和倾向得分匹配法矫正样本选择偏差后仍然成立。影响机制方面,企业战略之所以趋于激进,是由于董事高管责任保险通过提高风险承担水平和缓解融资约束,增加了管理层风险性投资行为。机制效果方面,董事高管责任保险产生自利效应而非激励效应,会加剧管理层的道德风险问题,诱发更多的机会主义行为,进而作用于企业战略。战略路径方面,购买董事高管责任保险的企业战略激进度上升,具体表现为策略性创新产出增加、金融化程度提高和无关产品多元化扩大。建议加强内外部监督机制，从股东、保险公司和政府机构三个方面监督管理层的决策行为，全面及时地披露董责险的内容信息，尽可以能抑制管理层道德风险和机会主义行为的出现。

［关键词］董事高管责任保险；企业战略；机会主义

［基金项目］国家自然科学基金项目(71874061)。

［作者简介］邢斐,华中科技大学经济学院副教授、博士；周泰云,华中科技大学经济学院博士研究生。

Directors′ and Officers′Liability Insurance and Corporate Strategy

XING Fei,ZHOU Tai-yun

Abstract：Is directors′and officers′liability insurance(D&O insurance) a management self-interest tool or a corporate governance tool? This is an important issue both in insurance theories and management theories.This paper systematically investigated the impact of D&O insurance on corporate strategy from the level of corporate behaviors.The results show that the purchase of D&O insurance significantly increases the aggressive level of corporate strategies.This is still true after using the instrumental variable method to control the endogeneity and the propensity score matching method to redress the sample selection deviation.In terms of the influencing mechanism,the reason for more aggressive strategy is that the D&O insurance helps to raise the corporate risk-taking level and ease financing constraints,thus heightens the management′s risk investment behaviors.In terms of mechanism effects,D&O insurance has the self-interest effect rather than the incentivizing effect,which causes moral hazards among directors and officers,induces more opportunistic behaviors,and in turn,has a bearing on corporate strategies.In terms of the strategic path,D&O insurance can render the corporate strategy more aggressive,which is characterized by higher strategic innovation output,higher financialization and higher diversification among unrelated products.The paper suggested to strengthen internal and external supervision, namely,  supervising the management board′s decision-making behaviors from the three levels of shareholders, insurers and government institutions,  fully and timely disclose the contents of insurers′ D & O insurance, and strive to repress the management board's moral hazard and opportunistic behaviors.

Key words：directors′ and officers′liability insurance;corporate strategy;opportunism