《保险研究》20191205-《险资持股能够降低公司违规吗?——保险投资的公司治理效应研究》(许荣、方明浩、常嘉路)

[中图分类号]F842.3 [文献标识码]A [文章编号]1004-3306(2019)12-0048-17 DOI:10.13497/j.cnki.is.2019.12.005

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[摘   要]尽管机构投资者的公司治理效应在理论模型中广受重视,但是由于机构投资者监督多数属于“幕后行动”难以观测而缺乏实证证据。本文利用保险投资在上市公司中的投资比重差异以及险种分类差异,提供了我国险资持股降低公司违规的治理效应以及具体作用机制的实证证据。首先,险资持股能够有效发挥公司治理作用,并且险资持股比例越高,降低上市公司违规次数的效果越明显。这一治理作用的发挥更多来自于持股比例高的第一大险资和传统险、分红险资金的监督效应。第二,险资持股降低公司违规的主要机制是通过保险机构实地调研上市公司的渠道实现,并且险资持股的治理效应更多地表现在控股股东持股比例较低和分析师跟踪较少的上市公司,表明险资持股是对内部治理机制中控股股东和外部治理机制中分析师跟踪的有效替代。

[关键词]保险资金;公司治理;公司违规;机构调研;分析师跟踪

[基金项目]本文为中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目成果(18XNI006)。

[作者简介]许荣,中国人民大学财政金融学院教授、博士生导师;方明浩(通讯作者),中国人民大学财政金融学院博士研究生;常嘉路,中国人民大学财政金融学院博士研究生。


Does Insurance Fund's Shareholding Reduce Corporate Frauds?—An Empirical Study Based on the Governance Effect of the Insurance Shareholding

XU Rong,FANG Ming-hao,CHANG Jia-lu

Abstract:The corporate governance effect by institutional investors has been widely emphasized in theoretical models,but there are scarce empirical evidences in related studies due to the behind-the-scene nature of institutional investors' oversight. We explored the difference of shareholdings by insurance institutions among the listed companies and the distribution among different types of insurance products,and found the empirical evidences of the governance effect and mechanisms that insurance fund's shareholding could reduce corporate fraud behaviors of Chinese listed companies. First,insurance fund's shareholding plays an important role in corporate governance of the listed entities,and the higher the shareholding,the more effective in reducing their malpractices. And this effect mainly comes from the oversight by the largest insurance shareholder and the traditional and participating accounts.  Second,insurance institution's onsite investigations are the main channel for reducing malpractices of the listed companies. And insurance shareholding’s governance effect is more significant in listed companies with  lower shareholding levels by controlling shareholders and low analyst coverage,which means that insurance fund can substitute the controlling shareholder as the inside governance mechanism and analyst coverage as the external mechanism.

Key words:insurance fund; corporate governance; corporate malpractice; institutional investigation; analyst coverage