《保险研究》20191008-《保险保障基金制度的检视与调整》(方乐)

[中图分类号]D922.284 [文献标识码]A [文章编号]1004-3306(2019)10-0101-13 DOI:10.13497/j.cnki.is.2019.10.008

资源价格:30积分

  • 内容介绍

[摘   要]保险保障基金在实现救助保单持有人和问题保险公司双重工具功能的同时,亦可能诱发集体非理性和公权力过度介入的双重负面效应。对此,一个妥善的制度安排应是尽可能放大工具的积极效能,消减工具的消极影响。然而,现有的法律规则一方面在基金费率的厘定和保单救助的设定上背离了风险收益相匹配理论,另一方面,在职权行使程序的制定和公司治理结构的安排上未有科学地考虑到保险保障基金公司的相对独立性,以致于保险保障基金的负面效应被进一步凸显。是故,有必要以风险收益匹配理论的遵循和机构相对独立性的保护为抓手,体系化地对相应保险保障基金规则实施调整。

[关键词]保险保障基金;负面效应;风险收益匹配;相对独立性

[作者简介]方乐,华东政法大学经济法学院博士研究生,研究方向:保险法、金融法,E-mail:le_happy1995@sina.com。


A Review of the Insurance Security Fund System and Its Adjustment

FANG Le

Abstract:While the use of insurance security fund could rescue the policyholder and the problematic insurance company,it may also induce the double negative effects of collective irrationality and excessive intervention of public power.A proper institutional arrangement should maximize the positive effectiveness of tools and minimize their negative effects.However,according to the existing legislation,the rules about fund rates and policy assistance have deviated from the theory of matching risk with return.Moreover,the legislators consider insufficiently the relative independence of Insurance Security Fund Corporation for the rules about procedure of exercising powers and corporate governance structure,which has further highlighted the negative effect of the insurance security fund.Therefore,it is necessary to follow the risk-return matching theory and protect the relative institutional independence to systematically readjust the corresponding rules about the fund.

Key words:insurance security fund;negative effects;the risk-return matching;relative independence