《保险研究》20230505-《董事高管责任保险、公司信息披露与高管减持》（许荣、戴静雯、傅文霁）

［摘   要］资本市场频现的减持可能出于高管自利性动机从而破坏市场公平交易，因而迫切需研究其治理机制。本文基于2007~2018年A股上市公司数据实证发现，公司购买董事高管责任保险（简称“董责险”）能显著抑制高管减持，该结论经PSM、工具变量等检验后保持稳健。进一步分析表明，第一，信息披露机制厘清了董责险能有效减弱高管的相对信息优势并抑制其出于自利性动机的减持行为；第二，董责险会增加高管减持成本并降低其自利倾向；第三，董责险抑制高管减持的作用在外部审计和法律监督较弱时更为显著，表明董责险是对公司外部治理机制的有效替代；第四，安慰剂检验显示，董责险能抑制高管而非大股东的减持,《证券法》修订和股份解禁的制度性冲击也表明，董责险主要针对高管自利性动机减持而非流动性管理动机减持发挥治理作用。基于保险机构作为利益相关者参与公司治理的视角，本文揭示了高管减持的制约机制，并有助于增进对董责险治理效应的认识。

［关键词］董事高管责任保险；高管减持；信息披露；公司治理

［基金项目］中国人民大学科学研究基金（中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助）项目（22XNH005）。

［作者简介］许荣，中国人民大学财政金融学院暨财政金融政策研究中心、保险研究所教授；戴静雯（通讯作者）,中国人民大学财政金融学院博士研究生；傅文霁,中国人民大学财政金融学院博士研究生。

Directors′ and Officers′ Liability Insurance,Corporate Information Disclosure and Executives′ Stock Selling

XU Rong,DAI Jing-wen,FU Wen-ji

Abstract：The frequent executives′ stock selling in the capital market may be motivated self-interest and cause great damage to fair trading in the market,thus it is urgent to study the corresponding governance mechanism.Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018,this paper finds that the purchase of directors′ and officers′ liability insurance (D&O insurance) by listed companies can significantly inhibit the executives′ stock selling.The conclusion remains stable after the tests of PSM and instrumental variables.Further analysis indicates that,firstly,the information disclosure mechanism clarifies that D&O insurance can effectively weaken executives′ relative information advantage and restrain their stock selling behavior motivated by self-interest.Secondly,D&O insurance can increase executives′ cost of stock selling and reduce their self-interest tendency.Thirdly,the effect of D&O insurance on executives′ selling is more significant when the external audit and legal supervision environment is weak,suggesting that D&O insurance is an effective substitute for the external corporate governance mechanism.Fourth,the placebo test shows that D&O insurance mainly has a governance effect on executives′ rather than large shareholders′ selling behavior.The institutional impacts of Securities Law revision and lifting the ban on shares also shows that D&O insurance mainly plays a governance role in executives′ selling under self-interest motivation rather than selling under liquidity management motivation.From the perspective of insurance institutions′ participation in corporate governance as stakeholders,this study reveals the restricting mechanism for executives′ stock selling,and helps to enhance the understanding of the governance effect of D&O insurance.

Key words：Directors′ and Officers′ Liability Insurance;executives′ stock selling;information disclosure;corporate governance