《保险研究》20210503-《董事高管责任保险与会计信息质量——兼议经济政策不确定性的调节作用》（张十根、王信平）

［摘   要］本文以2007~2018年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,考察董事高管责任保险对会计信息质量的影响以及经济政策不确定性对两者关系的调节作用。经验证据表明:董责险可以显著提高会计信息质量；经济政策不确定性会强化董责险与会计信息质量之间的正相关关系。进一步地,区分高管盈余操控动机、公司内外部治理机制以及经济政策不确定性的变化方向和变化程度后发现:高管面临的业绩压力会弱化董责险与会计信息质量之间的正相关关系,而高管薪酬激励以及分析师跟踪则均会强化董责险与会计信息质量之间的正相关关系；董责险仅在经济政策不确定性上升以及变化程度更大的样本中才能显著提高会计信息质量。渠道测试显示,董责险可以通过吸引和留住优秀的CEO、抑制高管的短视行为以及提高企业内部控制质量、降低代理成本等路径提高会计信息质量。

［关键词］会计信息质量；董责险；经济政策不确定性；公司治理

［基金项目］江西省2019年度研究生创新专项基金项目(YC2019-B078)；江苏高校哲学社会科学项目(2019SJA1748)。

［作者简介］张十根,江西财经大学会计学院博士生,盐城工学院经济管理学院讲师,研究方向:公司治理、财务会计与资本市场；王信平,副教授,江西财经大学会计学院博士生,研究方向:内部控制。

Directors’ and Officer’ Liability Insurance and Accounting Information Quality——The Moderating Role of Economic Policy Uncertainty

ZHANG Shi-gen,WANG Xin-ping

Abstract：Based on the sample of China’s A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2018,we tested the impact of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (hereinafter referred to as D&O Insurance) on accounting information quality and the moderating effect of economic policy uncertainty on the relationship of the two. It was found that,the D&O Insurance significantly improved accounting information quality and the economic policy uncertainty strengthened the positive correlation between them. Furthermore,after distinguishing the motivation of earnings manipulation of senior managers,the internal and external governance mechanism of the company,and the direction and intensity of change of economic policy uncertainty,it could be found that:the performance pressure faced by senior executives would weaken the positive correlation between the D&O Insurance and accounting information quality; executive compensation incentive and analyst tracking would strengthen the positive correlation between them; only when the economic policy uncertainty was rising and for samples with greater changes could the D&O Insurance improve the quality of accounting information. Channel test indicated that the D&O Insurance could improve accounting information quality by attracting excellent CEOs,restraining short-sighted behaviors of senior executives,improving the quality of internal control of enterprises and reducing agency costs.

Key words：accounting information quality; Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance; economic policy uncertainty; corporate governance